Monday, August 18, 2008

A Texas Guide to Loopholes

Let's face it. People commit crimes. Or, at least, they are alleged to have done so (unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law, etc.).

However, even if you're guilty of a crime, your conduct may be excused in law if it fits into one of the "defenses" articulated in the Texas Penal Code. Note that some are NOT defenses, but may simply mitigate punishment rather than excusing your conduct outright (as in the case of "intoxication").

Read on...

§ 8.01. INSANITY. (a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong.

(b) The term "mental disease or defect" does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended by Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 2640, ch. 454, § 1, eff. Aug.

29, 1983; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,

1994.

§ 8.02. MISTAKE OF FACT. (a) It is a defense to

prosecution that the actor through mistake formed a reasonable belief about a matter of fact if his mistaken belief negated the kind of culpability required for commission of the offense.

(b) Although an actor's mistake of fact may constitute a

defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of

any lesser included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact

were as he believed.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,

1994.

§ 8.03. MISTAKE OF LAW. (a) It is no defense to

prosecution that the actor was ignorant of the provisions of any law

after the law has taken effect.

(b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the

actor reasonably believed the conduct charged did not constitute a

crime and that he acted in reasonable reliance upon:

(1) an official statement of the law contained in a

written order or grant of permission by an administrative agency

charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in

question; or

(2) a written interpretation of the law contained in

an opinion of a court of record or made by a public official charged

by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question.

(c) Although an actor's mistake of law may constitute a

defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of

a lesser included offense of which he would be guilty if the law

were as he believed.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,

1994.

§ 8.04. INTOXICATION. (a) Voluntary intoxication does

not constitute a defense to the commission of crime.

(b) Evidence of temporary insanity caused by intoxication

may be introduced by the actor in mitigation of the penalty attached

to the offense for which he is being tried.

(c) When temporary insanity is relied upon as a defense and

the evidence tends to show that such insanity was caused by

intoxication, the court shall charge the jury in accordance with

the provisions of this section.>>

(d) For purposes of this section "intoxication" means

disturbance of mental or physical capacity resulting from the

introduction of any substance into the body.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,

1994.

§ 8.05. DURESS. (a) It is an affirmative defense to

prosecution that the actor engaged in the proscribed conduct

because he was compelled to do so by threat of imminent death or

serious bodily injury to himself or another.

(b) In a prosecution for an offense that does not constitute

a felony, it is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor

engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was compelled to do so

by force or threat of force.

(c) Compulsion within the meaning of this section exists

only if the force or threat of force would render a person of

reasonable firmness incapable of resisting the pressure.

(d) The defense provided by this section is unavailable if

the actor intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly placed himself in

a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to

compulsion.

(e) It is no defense that a person acted at the command or

persuasion of his spouse, unless he acted under compulsion that

would establish a defense under this section.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,

1994.

§ 8.06. ENTRAPMENT. (a) It is a defense to prosecution

that the actor engaged in the conduct charged because he was induced

to do so by a law enforcement agent using persuasion or other means

likely to cause persons to commit the offense. Conduct merely

affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not

constitute entrapment.

(b) In this section "law enforcement agent" includes

personnel of the state and local law enforcement agencies as well as

of the United States and any person acting in accordance with

instructions from such agents.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,

1994.

§ 8.07. AGE AFFECTING CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. (a) A

person may not be prosecuted for or convicted of any offense that

the person committed when younger than 15 years of age except:

(1) perjury and aggravated perjury when it appears by

proof that the person had sufficient discretion to understand the

nature and obligation of an oath;

(2) a violation of a penal statute cognizable under

Chapter 729, Transportation Code, except for conduct for which the

person convicted may be sentenced to imprisonment or confinement in

jail;

(3) a violation of a motor vehicle traffic ordinance

of an incorporated city or town in this state;

(4) a misdemeanor punishable by fine only other than

public intoxication;

(5) a violation of a penal ordinance of a political

subdivision;

(6) a violation of a penal statute that is, or is a

lesser included offense of, a capital felony, an aggravated

controlled substance felony, or a felony of the first degree for

which the person is transferred to the court under Section 54.02,

Family Code, for prosecution if the person committed the offense

when 14 years of age or older; or

(7) a capital felony or an offense under Section 19.02

for which the person is transferred to the court under Section

54.02(j)(2)(A), Family Code.

(b) Unless the juvenile court waives jurisdiction under

Section 54.02, Family Code, and certifies the individual for

criminal prosecution or the juvenile court has previously waived

jurisdiction under that section and certified the individual for

criminal prosecution, a person may not be prosecuted for or

convicted of any offense committed before reaching 17 years of age

except an offense described by Subsections (a)(1)-(5).

(c) No person may, in any case, be punished by death for an

offense committed while the person was younger than 18 years.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 2158, ch. 693, § 24, eff.

Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 1040, § 26, eff. Sept.

1, 1987; Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 1245, § 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1989;

Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 169, § 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1991; Acts

1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Amended by

Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 262, § 77, eff. Jan. 1, 1996; Acts

1997, 75th Leg., ch. 165, § 30.236, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts

1997, 75th Leg., ch. 822, § 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 1997,

75th Leg., ch. 1086, § 42, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 2001, 77th

Leg., ch. 1297, § 68, eff. Sept. 1, 2001; Acts 2003, 78th Leg.,

ch. 283, § 52, eff. Sept. 1, 2003; Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 787,

§ 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2005; Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 949, § 45,

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